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Abstract. The philosophy of Karl Popper was strongly used by the cladists in their battle against evolutionary and numerical 
taxonomy. It became known as “Systematics Wars” by David Hull. His historical account in Science as a Process, described the 
outcome of that era that end up with the victory of cladistics. Claiming it as hypothetico‑deductivist, and falsificationist, cladists 
have transformed and distorted Popper, that almost nothing of these ideas survived scrutiny. One of the Hull’s conclusion was 
that the success of cladistics was largely due to their ability to maintain social cohesion and intellectual orthodoxy during the 
years of the Systematic Wars. In this paper, I will provide a concise historical development about the appropriation of Popper’s 
ideas that were used by systematics, both as a defense and as a critic, trying to make clear the interpretations of these authors 
in relation to Popper and their research program. Using David Hull’s General Theory of Selection Processes, I will argue that 
these facts were, partially, to a heavy adherence to Popper’s philosophy.
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1 In the literature, we can observe that the name “cladist” appears replacing “phylogenetic systematics” derives from Mayr (1965). He used cladistics to refer to the persistence of this 
research group in merely reconstructing the “branching pattern”. He believed it was misleading that cladists call themselves a phylogenetic school, for they would ignore much 
of the phylogenetic process, e.g., ignoring differences in evolutionary rates (grades). This terminology, even if initially despised by the cladists (Hull, 1988), was adopted by the 
systematists, and will, therefore, be used interchangeably herein.
INTRODUCTION
The importance David Hull (1935‑2010) has to 
the Philosophy of Biology is huge. He is cited as 
“the person most responsible for the philosophy 
of biology achieving the status within philosophy 
that it has today. He is the single figure most re‑
sponsible for its flourishing. (Godfrey‑Smith, 2010, 
p. 749)”.
Furthermore, his importance for the develop‑
ment and maturation to the philosophy of cladists 
is also very representative. This can be exemplified 
by giving two, rather different in approaches, cita‑
tions, “David Hull (in  lit., 12/22/02) recounts how 
early in the ‘cladistic revolution’, Gary Nelson and 
Norman Platnick from the American Museum of 
Natural History asked him to suggest a self‑con‑
tained book on the philosophy of science. His 
suggestion was Popper. Rieppel (2008b, p.  297); 
David Hull, perhaps the first to identify the bul‑
ly‑boy tactics in systematics… (Williams & Ebach, 
2013, p. 178)”.
Hull’s influence in the systematic literature 
is very relevant and substantial. The straight‑
forward confirmation of this affirmation are the 
various citations of cladists (and non‑cladists) of 
his articles, e.g., his “Contemporary Systematic 
Philosophies” (Hull, 1970), and by indirect ways 
by their acknowledgments, where Hull was fre‑
quently cited; as an example, Hull was acknowl‑
edged by Platnick & Gaffney (1978b, p.  387) for 
“his painstaking criticisms of drafts of this series of 
reviews” that he performed in his role as associate 
editor of Systematic Zoology (from 1975‑1982), 
the principal journal that the “systematics wars” 
took place. These “systematics wars”, that occurred 
between the mid‑1960s through the 1980s, was 
characterized by a series of explosive debates 
between competing theories of biological clas‑
sification and phylogenetic inference. These 
competing theories were the (1)  phylogenetic 
systematics1, the (2)  evolutionary taxonomy and 
(3) the numerical taxonomy. The detailed history 
of these conflicts exist: David Hull’s book Science 
as a Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social 
and Conceptual Development of Science (Hull, 
1988) provides a vividly and detailed description 
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pated in those debates. Hull had a unique vantage point 
for analyzing this historical case. Trained as a philosopher 
and historian of science, Hull was so closely involved 
with his study of systematists that he became, besides an 
associate editor of Systematic Zoology, a board member 
of the Society of Systematic Biology (formerly known as 
Society of Systematic Zoology).
After de 1970s, as one of the results of the “systemat‑
ics wars”, the cladists quickly gained the general accep‑
tance of the scientific community, leaving the program 
of numerical taxonomy and Evolutionary systematatics 
in ostracism. At the end of the 1980s, cladistic analysis 
were quite common in the systematic literature. In the 
1990s (to nowadays), almost all publications dealing 
with systematics are based on cladistic analysis. As David 
Hull (1988) said, the cladists won the “war of systematics”.
While the method of cladistic analysis rapidly acceler‑
ated and ended up translating into easy‑to‑use comput‑
er software packages, the underlying theory and philos‑
ophy of Hennig’s (1950, 1966) phylogenetic systematics 
remained unexplored. Instead, especially in the last four 
decades, the philosophy of science elaborated by Karl 
Popper (2002) was appealed to support and defend the 
cladists. Unequivocally, no other work of a philosopher 
had so much influence during this formative period in 
systematics. Much, but not all, of the early discourse on 
Popper and systematics dealt with the philosophical ba‑
sis of systematics as science. Starting from Wiley (1975), 
Popper was always referred to as his patron saint (Hull, 
1988), to the present day, e.g., Kluge (2009); Farris (2013); 
Crother & Murray (2015); Brower (2016).
This analysis is not about whether Popper’s philoso‑
phy of science is good, adequate, accurate or practical, 
but instead will address what Popper wrote and wheth‑
er his philosophy applies to phylogenetic systematics, 
and trace the motives of their longevity influence within 
this research program. Starting with the evidence of the 
main articles that both defended and criticized Popper’s 
ideas in systematic, I will examine what was the role of 
Popper regarding this “victory”. By using David Hull’s the‑
sis, the so‑called General Theory of Selection Processes 
(Losee, 2001), which is a thesis explaining the conceptual 
change in the social organization of science based from 
three contrasting key elements: (1) desire for credit in op‑
posite to mutual verification; (2) competition in opposite 
to cooperation and (3) cohesion in opposite to social iso‑
lation, as a factor of success among cladists. Therefore, 
according to Hull, the success of cladistics was largely 
due to cladists ability to maintain social cohesion and in‑
tellectual orthodoxy during the early years of the dispute 
in contrast to the more loosely organized pheneticists; 
herein I will argue for the importance that Popper had 
for this process.
Hull’s thesis
Broadly speaking, Hull’s thesis says that conceptual 
change occurs most rapidly in areas of science, where 
scientists are organized into tightly knit research groups. 
Traditionally, the philosophers of science have argued 
that the growth of knowledge occurs through continu‑
ous testing and the selective elimination of hypotheses. 
Hull agrees, but emphasizes that this screening process 
is neither a random nor an individual subject; is a social 
phenomenon. So, by emphasizing the social structure of 
science, Hull developed a naturalistic philosophy. For in‑
stance for this social approach, a scientist rarely submits 
his estimation hypothesis to rigorous scrutiny. Scrutiny 
of hypotheses is usually made by other scientists, usually 
by their intellectual opponents. Consequently, Hull ar‑
gues that conceptual development occurs most rapidly 
in the areas of science, divided into competing research 
groups.
In both its competitive and cooperative aspects, sci‑
ence is a social phenomenon that occurs mainly at the 
level of the research group. One of the most interesting 
implications, and for Hull most important, of this analysis 
of conceptual change is that concepts should be thought 
of as lineages, not types. As concepts are transmitted 
from one scientist to another, they are often modified. 
Within a conceptual lineage, ideas can, in fact, become 
so modified that they do not resemble the original. Other 
important set of ideas developed in Science as a Process 
comprise a version of evolutionary epistemology, that is, 
plainly: a naturalistic approach to epistemology, which 
emphasizes the importance of natural selection in two 
primary roles. In the first role, selection is the generator 
and maintainer of the reliability of our senses and cog‑
nitive mechanisms, as well as the “fit” between those 
mechanisms and the world. In the second role, trial and 
error learning and the evolution of scientific theories are 
construed as selection processes (Bradie & Harms, 2017).
Hull applied his replicator/interactor analysis of evo‑
lution to change within science itself. Selection, being a 
process in which the differential extinction and prolifer‑
ation of interactors cause the differential perpetuation 
of the relevant replicators (Hull, 1988). Replicators and 
interactors being the entities that function in selection 
processes, and scientific ideas are competing replica‑
tors in something like the way genes are. In conceptu‑
al lineages, we have the replicators and the interactors. 
Replicators do not interact with the environment; it is the 
scientists who interact with the environment, scientific 
concepts not. But, this approach has not been especially 
fruitful (Godfrey‑Smith, 2010), and it has been criticized 
by some authors (Dupré, 1990; Kitcher, 1988; Sterelny, 
1994). Therefore, I will not give much emphasis in this 
method herein; the analogy can be interesting, but we 
do not need to use it as a base to this (or any other) the‑
ory of science. Finally, the epistemic tools scientists have 
developed for evolutionary theory – things like quantita‑
tive models, type specimens, comparative methods, and 
so on – fail to carry over to social processes (Sterner & 
Lidgard, 2018).
Therefore, Hull applied the General Theory of 
Selection Processes in two ways‑as a framework for the 
interpretation of the history of science, and as a theory 
of science. One of its consequences, it would be evolu‑
tionarily self‑defeating to fabricate data or otherwise un‑
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dermine the scientific enterprise. Hull’s theory explains 
why cases of professional misconduct are rare among 
scientists, and provides a rationale for the success of sci‑
ence as a point in the interpretative framework for the 
delineation of conceptual lineages (Losee, 2001).
Popper’s Philosophy and its relation to Biology
Karl Popper (1902‑1994) is considered one of the 
most influential philosophers of twentieth‑century sci‑
ence. He is perhaps best known for his criterion of demar‑
cation between science and pseudoscience. Popper was 
determined to identify some criterion for distinguishing 
scientific theories from pseudo‑scientific theories. This 
criterion was for Popper the mark of a scientific theory. 
According to Popper, a theory is scientific only if it makes 
predictions that can be tested and possibly shown to be 
false, i.e., it is falsifiable (Sarkar & Pfeifer, 2006). Briefly, fal‑
sificationism is a philosophical thesis about the scientific 
method. In Popper’s view, scientific theories and hypoth‑
eses should not be evaluated on the basis of confirma‑
tion (or verification), but of falsification (Popper, 1959).
The philosopher Karl Popper is still enormously pop‑
ular with natural scientists in general and biologists in 
particular, even though in recent discussion in academic 
philosophy of science, he definitely seems to be fading 
(Godfrey‑Smith, 2007). As an example of his popularity 
we can read the following statement from the cladists: 
“we agree with Medawar’s characterization of Popper as 
‘incomparably the greatest philosopher of science that 
has ever been’… and we urge every systematist to ac‑
quire some knowledge of his work. Platnick & Gaffney 
(1978b, p. 360)”.
Still within the cladists, in 1979 he was awarded the 
Gold Medal by the American Museum of Natural History 
for “Distinguished Service to Science” (American Museum 
of Natural History, 1979). However, as noted above, nu‑
merous philosophers has argued against such claim. 
For instance, Stamos (2007) affirmed “… that biologists 
should stop citing Popper on what a genuine scientific 
theory is, or on what good science is.” And argued that as 
biology has no laws (same position supported by some 
philosophers, e.g., Beatty (1995), and for Popper genuine 
science is only through the use of laws of nature; no test‑
ing of laws, or no use of laws for explanation or predic‑
tion, and no science. Biology, more precisely, evolution‑
ary biology, then, would not be his “science”. However, 
even with no genuine laws of its own, Biology would still 
count as a science, only now as a historical science (for 
details, see Cleland, 2002).
Popper also wrote about evolutionary theory (1972, 
1974, 1978). However, he had some problems with this 
subject that are well known (Hull, 1999; Elgin & Sober, 
2017). Popper (1957) argued that there are no general 
laws governing the evolution of societies, the evolution 
of organisms, or the evolution of the whole universe. 
What we have for these evolutions are trends. For Popper 
trends are not laws, and about this, he stated, “a state‑
ment asserting the existence of a trend at a certain time 
and place would be a singular historical statement, not a 
universal law. (Popper, 1957, p. 115)”.
With accusations of evolutionary theory being: “tau‑
tological, or almost tautological” (Popper, 1972) and 
“I have come to the conclusion that Darwinism is not 
a testable scientific theory, but a metaphysical research 
programme… (Popper, 1974, p. 134)”.
Later, Popper (1978) changed his mind and denied 
that Darwinism is a tautology, and that natural selection, 
though difficult to test, is in principle testable. These 
statements were one of the reasons why the biologists’ 
failed to take his views seriously (Hull, 1999). He tried to 
improve his ideas, e.g., Popper (1978), but Hull (1999) 
have not been able to find any biologist who has taken 
up Popper’s suggestion, and I think this is true even today.
POPPER ADEQUACY WITH 
PHYLOGENETIC SYSTEMATICS
Main critics and defenders of Popper’s view
Before the 1970s, Popper’s work did not directly affect 
systematic thinking and its methodology2. His appear‑
ance in systematics appeared when Bock (1973) intro‑
duced it to systematists, drawing attention to philosophy 
in the sciences of classification “Biological classification 
is a science, and as such should be treated within some 
philosophical framework of the criteria of scientific theo‑
ries and methodologies. Herein, I accept the philosophi‑
cal approach to science advocated by Karl Popper… And 
I would advocate that the theory and particularly the 
methodology of biological classification should be for‑
mulated according to the Popperian philosophy of sci‑
ence. (Bock, 1973, p. 381)”.
Bock argued that classical evolutionary classification 
should prevail as a classification system on numerical 
taxonomists and cladistics because of its consistency 
with Popper’s ideas “Classical evolutionary classification 
is based on the Popperian philosophy of scientific de‑
marcation and methodology and on the modern synthe‑
sis of Darwinian evolution… (Bock, 1973: 391)”.
Quickly, the cladists recruited Popper as demonstrat‑
ing that the phylogenetic systematics, unlike its compet‑
itors, that was applicable to Popper, and so would be the 
only genuine science for ranking the phylogenetic order. 
In this way, appropriating Popper’s philosophy. This is 
explained by Hull (1988) as being the resurrection of a 
famous but long‑neglected scientist or philosopher in 
the area of disputed research, scientists feel a genuine 
obligation to recognize unappreciated work. These ref‑
erences are used to promote the contributions of the au‑
thor himself and his research group. If a scientist thinks 
his visions are being ignored or treated unfairly, it is diffi‑
cult for him to say this without seeming selfish, so unrec‑
ognized famous precursors are especially useful under 
2 Ghiselin (1966) made the first implicitly reference to Popper, but was far from basing all the 
structure of taxonomic theory and providing a background for an objective choice among 
competing systematic methodologies, as Bock (1973) made for the evolutionary taxonomy.
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such circumstances. In the individualization of programs 
in the scientific approach, if opponents choose a specific 
figure as a patron saint, one can always try to co‑opt their 
choice. Just like the cladists have done with Popper.
The first cladist to do this was Wiley (1975). As a re‑
sponse to Bock (1973), the author stated that, in fact, only 
phylogenetic systematics would be in accordance with 
Popper’s principles (Wiley, 1975). Popper constitutes the 
first pillar of phylogenetic systematics in its “war” with the 
evolutionary and pheneticist. However, Hull (1988) states 
that this author starts from important ways of the views 
expressed by Popper himself. Wiley and the systematists 
did not simply adopt Popper’s views; they transformed 
them. This can be demonstrated in this same article “an 
hypothesis of synapomorphy which has a greater num‑
ber of potential falsifiers may be said to exist at a higher 
level of universality than another hypothesis of synapo‑
morphy which has fewer potential falsifiers and the for‑
mer would have more weight than the latter when they 
conflict [italics in the original]. (Wiley, 1975, p. 236)”.
It should be noted that in principle, following Popper’s 
philosophy, neither the justifications of Bock (1973) nor 
of Wiley (1975) fit Popper (the justifications for this state‑
ment will follow herein). Popper’s transformation con‑
tinued, as in Platnick & Gaffney (1977), which is part of 
a series of revisions by Platnick & Gaffney (1977, 1978a, 
1978b) with the purpose of “informing systematists about 
relevant ideas in Popper’s works” (Gaffney, 1979, p. 105). 
In this work, Platnick & Gaffney (1977) emphasized in the 
systematic literature the use of universal statements in 
their research program to fit Popper’s philosophy “within 
the context of phylogenetic systematics… The term ‘ver‑
tebrate’ [as a universal law of nature] can be used to refer 
to any organism that possesses the defining characters 
(synapomorphies) of both Vertebrata and all the larger 
groups to which Vertebrata belongs. (Platnick & Gaffney, 
1977, p. 140)”.
As can be seen, these authors went so far as to reject 
what Popper (1957, p. 107) himself said about the case 
of “vertebrates having a pair of common ancestors” as 
being universal. About this issue, Popper wrote that “the 
evolution of life on earth… is a unique historical pro‑
cess… Its description, however, is not a law, but only a 
singular historical statement. (Popper, 1957, p. 108)”.
As we put Popper’s terminology into scrutiny, it is 
possible to state that we can be deceived as his termi‑
nology can be misleading (Hull, 1999). About this series 
of article by Platnick & Gaffney, Rieppel (2008a) stated 
that they really had made a misconception that the hy‑
pothetico‑deductive model of scientific explanation in 
their application to cladistics. Thus, these cladists have 
“used and abused philosophers” as they choose Popper 
as a weapon against their opponents, at the same time 
failing to understanding his philosophy (Hull, 1981). 
Clearly, ‘All spiders in the New World have eight legs’, can‑
not be argued using Popper’s philosophy since universal 
statements stem from the assumption that they are un‑
restricted in the temporal and spatial realm. Moreover, 
scientific laws are strictly unverifiable. All these theories 
are of a universal nature, and no finite collection of ob‑
servation statements, however large, is logically equiv‑
alent, or can justify, an unrestricted universal proposi‑
tion. Then by canonical modus tollens based on the rule 
of classical logic, it is possible to infer deductively the 
falsity of a universal proposition, once established the 
truth‑value of an appropriately related singular proposi‑
tion. For Popper this means that the central type of infer‑
ences involved in science is deduced from observation 
statements of the form “This A is not X” for the falsity of 
the corresponding universal hypotheses, and such infer‑
ences occur in the critical tests of such hypotheses, and 
not in its generation.
Although Popper is right that a universal generaliza‑
tion can be distorted by only a negative instance, many 
statements in science are not that way. For example, sci‑
entific theories claim the existence of things like black 
holes, atoms, viruses, DNA, and so on. Statements that 
affirm the existence of something cannot be falsified 
by the inability to find them (Ladyman, 2002). The exis‑
tential statements of biology are exactly of this kind, for 
they are space‑temporally restricted (Stamos, 2007). As 
Hull (1988) argued, the rise of cladistic scientific research 
groups, based while they were centered on the American 
Museum of Natural History in New York, will be import‑
ant for this function of social cohesion. Popper’s articles 
were extensity used by this group, which was nominally 
referenced by the figure of Gareth Nelson by Hull (1988), 
alongside all other people directly or indirectly attached 
to him and to their original group, such as Edmund 
Wiley, Norman Platnick, James Farris, Daniel Brooks, Joel 
Cracaft, Collin Patterson, and Arnold Kluge (the details of 
affiliations and historical social cohesion among these 
people are offered by Hull (1988).
The first systematist to criticize the existence of these 
universal statements in phylogenetic systematics was 
Kitts (1977). He states that in constructing a phylogeny in 
which the descendant‑ancestral relationship enters two 
populations, the asymmetry between verifiable and falsi‑
fiable is lost. This is why this relation is a statement about 
two universal classes and is therefore equivalent to a 
conjunction of statements about the relations between 
individuals. That statement would be, at least in princi‑
ple, both verifiable and falsifiable. Moreover, the difficul‑
ty of verifying or falsifying it would be a contingent diffi‑
culty in the search for historical knowledge. Kitts (1977) 
continues his argument showing the incompatibility of 
universal statements in Systematics, and, in this way fail‑
ing to be in accord to Popper’s philosophy.
After Kitts, other systematics scientists countered the 
application of Popper’s falsifiability in systematics, argu‑
ing over the inapplicability of universal statements, and 
the inadequacy of the hypothetical‑deductive method. 
For example, Panchen (1982) stated that, “again (and 
again unfortunately) this would still not be a case of the 
hypothetico‑deductive method according to Popper, de‑
spite the logical validity of modus tollens and the truth of 
the propositions. This is because each of those proposi‑
tions is either contingent, i.e. not a strictly universal state‑
ment but one that described a spatio‑temporally limited 
state of affairs… (Panchen, 1982, p. 312)”.
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Then Hull (1983) himself wrote on this subject, ex‑
plaining the differences between universal, numerical 
and singular (or existential) utterances. He argued that 
only the universals does the asymmetry between falsi‑
fication and verification exist, and that systematics does 
not have this characteristic, thus, it does not fit Popper. 
Subsequently, he warns the systematists about their pa‑
tron saint stating that: “All truth does not reside in the 
writings of Sir Karl Popper.” (Hull 1983, p. 178). To reso‑
nate Popper’s (1959) ‘The Logic of Scientific Discovery’ 
Gaffney (1979) wrote an influential article titled ‘An 
Introduction to the Logic of Phylogeny’ in which he 
sketched a hypothetico‑deductive approach to the cla‑
distic analysis (Rieppel, 2008a). This article was also, once 
again, an appeal against the so‑called “authoritarianism”, 
mainly by Mayr and Simpson, from the evolutionary tax‑
onomy (Gaffney, 1979). The continued application of the 
hypothetico‑deductive approach revealed to be very 
important for the cladists, as can be seen used by some 
very influential books, e.g., Wiley & Lieberman (2011) and 
Ax (1987) and articles, e.g., Farris (1983) and Kluge (2005).
The cladists replies were strong and even aggres‑
sive against these propositions of universal statements. 
According to his thesis, to succeed in science the scien‑
tists must behave aggressively. Therefore, it follows that 
scientists are being asked to behave in ways they do not 
find especially easy. This could be clearly observed by 
the responses against Kitts (1977). His claim was immedi‑
ately attacked in unambiguous terms by several cladists. 
For instance, in a series of replies, Cracraft (1978), Nelson 
(1978) and Patterson (1978) argued that existential state‑
ments are universal; this united front was a cohesive 
response to these attacks. But the strongest example 
of aggressiveness of the cladists against a person with 
opposing ideas is the revision of Hull’s book Science as 
a Process by Farris & Platnick (1989) where they say: “In 
short, Hull has produced a flawed (and sometimes despi‑
cable) book that systematists will peruse mostly for the 
“gossip” it contains”. (Farris & Platnick, 1989, p. 310).
This cladistics created a social circle based on and 
united by a particular thesis, namely, Popper’s knows 
best, on which everything else – history, theory, meth‑
odology – is judged. Thus, these animosities that arise 
during the course of science are complicated by the al‑
liances that scientists form. A common answer among 
scientists is to attack “opponents” while they mutually 
support allies (Hull, 1988).
On the ad hoc hypotheses of homoplasy
Another point of the appropriation of Popper’s ideas 
in systematics was the idea that parsimonious genea‑
logical hypotheses are those that minimize the require‑
ments for ad hoc hypotheses of homoplasy. This state‑
ment had its first appearance in Gaffney (1979), but it 
was fully developed in Farris (1983) – this article is con‑
sidered by many as the most important in the field. One 
of the goals of this article was to reply the assertions of 
Cartmill (1981), that stated the status of phylogenetic 
hypotheses are not falsifiable in Popper’s sense, arguing 
that parsimony does not conforms with falsificationism; 
about this, he wrote that “Phylogenetic reconstruction is 
possible. However, Popperian phylogenetic reconstruc‑
tion apparently is not” (Cartmill, 1981, p.  92). One im‑
portant point advanced by Cartmill is the relation about 
cladistics, Popper and the evolutionary biology; claiming 
that they are not compatible in relation to Popper’s phi‑
losophy. As the reply to Cartmill (1981) goes, Farris (1983) 
accuses Cartmill’s argument to rest on a misrepresenta‑
tion of Popper. In defense of Popper, Farris connects the 
ideas on phylogenetic inference to questions regarding 
the scientific method; Farris, instructs cladists to prefer 
hypotheses that have greater explanatory power – that 
is, they require less ad hoc hypotheses. This is so because 
they reduce the explanatory power of the hypothesis. 
These arguments became, from then on, the most used 
for the justification of cladistics (using parsimony). This 
can be demonstrated by the use of this justification in 
textbooks of systematic, e.g., Wiley & Lieberman (2011); 
Schuh & Brower (2009); Wheeler (2012). Another applica‑
tion of this approach is found in Kluge (1997; 1998) and 
Nixon & Carpenter (2011). They argue that explaining 
congruent synapomorphies as homologies in the more 
severely tested and less falsified cladogram is considered 
a consequence of defining homology and that, in this 
sense, homoplasy can be understood as a quantity of er‑
ror in the inference of homology, that is, all homoplasy is 
a mistake. As a matter of clarification, briefly, homoplasy 
is similarity that is not the result of common ancestry, but 
of reversion to an ancestral trait in a lineage or indepen‑
dent evolution (convergence or parallelism), i.e., homo‑
plasy is one of the outcomes of evolution. Exploitation of 
homoplasy can illuminate the limits of phenotypic evo‑
lution, nature and the reasons for biases in its direction, 
and why “descent with modification” can follow predict‑
able paths (Wake et al., 2011). From this, we can see that 
these systematists “transformed” the theory of evolution 
in order to fit Popper.
Subsequently, Kluge (2001) argues that homoplasy 
does not explain anything in the hypothesis process of 
the relationship between descendant ancestral species. 
In Kluge (1999) the use of Popper was even stronger, us‑
ing its testability formula (S (e, h, b) = C (h, e, b) = (p (e, h
b) – p, b)) / …, where e is evidence, h is hypothesis and 
b is background knowledge) for systematics. The trans‑
formation was done as follows, “therefore, h1 is the most 
highly corroborated, most severely tested of the three 
competing cladograms‑C(h1,e,b) > C(h2,e,b) or C(h3,e,b), 
assuming only “descent, with modification.” Further, 
in choosing the least falsified cladogram‑according to 
Farris’ phylogenetic parsimony criterion, minimizing re‑
quirements for ad hoc propositions of homoplasy‑h1 is 
maximally explanatory, more synapomorphies being 
interpretable as homologues on h1 than on h2 or h3. 
(Kluge 1999, p. 433)”.
However, as with universal statements, there is a seri‑
ous problem with this hypothetical‑deductive approach 
and with these ad hoc hypotheses of homoplasy in the 
systematic. Sober (1988) has argued that Popper’s usu‑
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al deductive interpretations simply do not apply to the 
problem of phylogenetic inference. He was the first to 
argue that one does not deduce the truth of a geneal‑
ogy of character distributions and process theory, rath‑
er, it is inferred that one genealogy is better supported 
than another (Sober 1988). Later, Rieppel (2005) argued 
using the methodology of Induction developed by 
Carnap (1962), more precisely, his requirement of total 
evidence, demonstrates that phylogenetic systematics 
is not hypothetic‑deductively structured, because this 
requirement is called while conducting a cladistics anal‑
ysis. Furthermore, Vogt (2008, 2013) has cogently argued 
that homoplasies are a result of evolution, being part of 
its background knowledge,thus, not being characterized 
as ad hoc hypotheses (sensu Farris, 1983). Rieppel (2003, 
2004, 2005, 2006) has also challenged the idea of ad hoc 
hypotheses of homoplasy in systematics, alongside the 
failure to apply the Popperian falsifiability to parsimony 
analysis. Finally, while discussing for abductive reason‑
ing in systematics, Fitzhugh (2006) arrived these same 
conclusions.
However, again, no systematist from the research 
group originating during the “systematic wars” gave in 
to these criticisms. This research group carried out the 
following process: publications and mutual citations of 
Popper compliance, failing to take these criticisms into 
account, or accusing them of not understanding their 
ideas. Hull (1988) writes that reason, argument, and evi‑
dence often decide controversy in science, but when sci‑
entists need to make choices, the evidence is never fully 
determined, nor the arguments fully convincing; and on 
this he writes that, “mutual positive citations within a 
research group serve to promote social cohesion within 
that group. Negative citations of one’s opponents also 
promote cohesion within the group as well as demarcate 
it from other groups. (Hull, 1988, p. 286)”.
To get two concrete examples, let us look at the re‑
plies to Rieppel’s (2003) work. One of the authors who 
left to defend their ideas was Kluge (2009). Using words 
like “…misunderstanding to the use of modus tollens 
in phylogenetic inference…” Kluge criticized Rieppel’s 
(2003) propositions in using Popper for this, primarily, a 
way of hiding behind the names of famous philosophers 
and their isms, thereby often erecting rhetorical argu‑
ments with authoritarian content. Farris (2008, p. 8) con‑
testing the use of Popper’s philosophy by Rieppel (2003), 
he appealed once more to the Popperian authority by 
demanding the critics of Popper to “consider the relevant 
parts of Popper’s work.”
Again, I can use Hull’s (1988) thesis to explain this 
behavior, since those who oppose others research pro‑
grams serve to reinforce the internal cohesion of asso‑
ciated research groups, as long as a particular research 
program is under attack and is at risk of being defeated, 
proponents of this program tend to present a united co‑
operative association. This can be explained as one of 
the reasons for the recipe of the cladists’ success. This de‑
fense of Popper, among other things, like remaining ter‑
minologically rigid and conceptually open (Hull, 1988), 
that made the cladists win the “systematics war”. It is ar‑
gued here that this was a very relevant factor in keep‑
ing themselves socially cohesive, considering that only 
cladistis had a famous (and professional) philosopher at 
their methodological disposition and that they would be 
sure that only cladistics would be pure science (against 
the pseudosciences of the numerical taxonomists and 
evolutionary taxonomy). In the case of the numerical tax‑
onomists, they never used Popper in their methodolog‑
ical justifications, but instead used in their philosophy 
the writings of J.S.L. Gilmour and P.W. Bridgman (Hull, 
1981). However, as Hull (1981) argued neither Gilmour 
nor Bridgman were a professional philosopher, and the 
combination of phenomenalism and operationalism 
urged by these two men was long ago rejected as un‑
tenable by professional philosophers; they did not had 
a ‘patron saint’. Thus, the numerical taxonomists lost the 
“systematics wars” because they did not form a sufficient‑
ly cohesive group to “survive” this “war.” As Hull (1988) ar‑
gues in the book, “civil war never broke out among the 
pheneticists, not because pheneticists found themselves 
in such massive agreement but because their social or‑
ganization became increasingly diffuse. They did not re‑
main cohesive enough, either socially or conceptually, to 
speciate. Cladists, to the contrary, remained socially very 
tightly‑knit. As their views became more widely accept‑
ed, they fought off attempts to take over their research 
program from the outside. (Hull, 1988, p. 247)”.
“Looking back, it would seem that Sokal made two 
mistakes. He did not insist strongly enough on concep‑
tual orthodoxy and branched out into too many oth‑
er areas before his power base in biology was secure. 
Cladists made neither of these mistakes. Given the power 
of hindsight, the major mistake that Farris made was to 
hold on too tightly to the running of the Hennig Society. 
Conceptual orthodoxy and social cohesion are benefi‑
cial, just so long as they are not overdone… (Hull, 1988, 
p. 275‑276)”.
CONCLUSION
As a conclusion, we can see the essential (it was nec‑
essary, but not sufficient) influence of Popper for the 
success and the supremacy of cladistics by winning the 
“science wars” that led to the demise of numerical tax‑
onomy and evolutionary systematics (Rieppel, 2008b). In 
the 70’s and 80’s it was a very important social cohesion 
factor among the cladists, being used as support against, 
mainly, the numerical taxonomists, that ended up falling 
in the ostracism. This is all because Popper’s ideas are not 
appropriate for systematics (this applies to the histori‑
cal sciences in general). This attitude can be considered 
not an accurate description of how systematics works, 
but was, nevertheless, important for the cooperation of 
this research group, since science, as a social activity, has 
much of its development from processes that are beyond 
the evidence and well‑supported hypotheses. Scientists 
in their most difficult times during the conflict of research 
programs, along with philosophers of science, almost all 
the time insist that science is primarily a matter of reason, 
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argument, and evidence. However, it is very important to 
take into account the words of Hull “in the ongoing pro‑
cess of science, the inherent worth of ideas is far from 
irrelevant, but it is also far from sufficient… Being “right” 
is not enough. Scientists must convert their fellow scien‑
tists as well. (Hull, 1988, p. 114)”.
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